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The fog of propaganda: Attempts to 
influence the reporting of the “Arab 
Spring” and how journalists should see 
through them 
 
 
 
 
 
James Rodgers, a former BBC Foreign Correspondent turned “hackademic”, examines 
governments’ attempts to manage the media. In response, he suggests journalists need 
to adopt rigorous research and fact-checking, and develop wide networks of sources in 
order to break through the fog of propaganda 
After a helicopter attack on a village in Francis Ford Coppola’s film Apocalypse Now, set 
during the Vietnam War, the US troops who carried out the assault try to convince the 
village’s terrified inhabitants that they are there to help them. A television news director, 
played by Coppola himself, urges the soldiers to act naturally, despite the presence of the 
camera crew. It is perhaps fitting that the great filmmaker is included this scene, for it is the 
Vietnam War – a conflict far from the homes of the American soldiers who fought it, and yet 
which bitterly divided political opinions on their doorsteps – which still echoes through the 
American wars, and the journalism scholarship, which came later.   
Beginning with the work of Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky, and Daniel Hallin, in the 
1980s, that scholarship has often focused on the extent to which the news media are 
influenced by political pressure, and the extent to which the news media have influenced 
political elites in their decision making. Coppola’s television director and his crew are part of 
an attempt to make the war seem worthwhile, noble even, to audiences far away who are 
paying for it in tax dollars, and in some cases, with the blood of their sons. Increasingly, 
governments seem convinced that in wartime media campaigns are not only a wise, but an 
indispensable, use of their resources. Government propaganda in wartime is nothing new, of 
course – but the “Arab Spring” has shown us that it continues, and thrives. There are 
challenges, and lessons, here for journalism. New technology, so often seen as a crucial factor 
in the way the “Arab Spring” unfolded, and allowed people to challenge their rulers, will not 
alone shine brightly enough to drive away the fog of propaganda, and allow audiences to see 
clearly.  
 Attempts at News Management: The Fairly Subtle, and the Faintly Ridiculous 
In March 2011, with the Nato bombing campaign in Libya newly underway, the Ministry of 
Defence in London put out a story that an air strike on targets in Tripoli had been aborted. 
The reason: to avoid civilian casualties. The story was duly reported by the Mail Online, 1 
ITV News, 2 the BBC, 3 and others. Announcing some days later the convening of a 
conference on Libya, the British Foreign Secretary, William Hague, made reference to it, 
again in the context of the length to which the UK and its allies were prepared to go to avoid 
civilian deaths. 4 
Consider this as a news story in the light of the old saying about “man bites dog” being news. 
As every trainee reporter or first year journalism undergraduate knows, “man bites dog” is a 
story precisely because it is out of the ordinary. Sometimes, when weighing up the strength of 
a story, it can be instructive to consider whether the opposite would be newsworthy. The 
headline in the Mail Online was: “Mission aborted on orders of SAS: RAF attack is halted 
after troops spot human shields.” The headline of the opposite story would be something like: 
“RAF attack goes ahead despite human shields.”  
By any normal news values – leaving aside humanitarian considerations – the second is a 
much better story. It is much more unusual. It is shocking. One would hope that the RAF 
always strives to avoid civilian casualties – therefore, the extent to which such an 
announcement can really be considered newsworthy is highly questionable. In other words, is 
it really a story? As the press announcement of a government trying to convince an electorate 
weary of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that this new offensive in Libya was worthwhile, it 
clearly served its purpose. It was also, from the perspective of any officials who were seeking 
to influence and shape the news agenda, delightfully difficult to verify.  
So was the presence of the SAS 5 “spotters” to which the Mail Online article referred. This 
story of the SAS saving civilian lives may well have been true. It is perfectly reasonable to 
believe that British Special Forces, or their agents, were in Tripoli to assist the targeting of 
attacks. It is also perfectly impossible for a journalist to check, unless they suddenly came 
across the SAS in a Tripoli street (highly unlikely, given the restrictions under which 
international journalists were placed in Libya then). That angle too needed to be considered 
in the context of the time.  
Up to that point in the military campaign against Colonel Gaddafi, the SAS had not had a 
particularly good press. Their most prominent appearance in the news had been with the word 
“fiasco” attached to their august initials. “Fiasco” was the conclusion to the rather bizarre tale 
of SAS personnel landing in Libya, apparently unannounced, in the middle of the night and 
being “captured by a group of farmers. This James Bond-style story did not end well for 
those on Her Majesty’s Secret Service. They were detained, and then rather shamefully sent 
back whence they came by those they had come to help. As James Kirkup wrote in the Daily 
Telegraph, 6 the incident was an “embarrassing failure”, which left the Foreign Secretary, 
“drawing laughter from MPs” when he explained to parliament that it “was caused by a 
‘serious misunderstanding’ about their mission”. One wonders if the Ministry of Defence 
communications team, preparing the press release about the raid being aborted, sensed a 
simultaneous opportunity to polish the public image of Special Forces whose activities had so 
recently “drawn laughter”. If so, they succeeded. The SAS’s cool-headed and compassionate 
role in the story of the aborted raid featured in many accounts.  
The fault lies not with government press officers. They cannot be blamed for doing their job, 
which is to present military personnel, their political masters, and the activities of both, in a 
favourable light. The fact that they do so by means of a story which is almost impossible to 
disprove just makes their tactics all the more effective. It is the job of the journalist to try to 
see through this (unless, as in some cases, a flag-waving editorial line discourages such 
enquiry). Sometimes, as in the next example I want to consider, they do so very successfully.    
Their task is not always terribly difficult. In June 2011, the BBC’s Wyre Davies, who was 
covering the conflict in Libya, reported his experience of being taken by Libyan government 
minders to see civilians apparently injured in NATO air strikes. 7 It turned out to be nothing 
of the sort. Perhaps understanding that the suffering of children in wartime can make 
particularly memorable and heartbreaking television footage, the minders encouraged the 
international reporters, including Davies, to tell the story of an infant girl, Hanin, who, the 
Libyan officials said, had been injured in by NATO bombing.  
This, of course, was impossible to verify, but reasonable to assume. It was highly likely that 
there had been civilian casualties as a result of Nato’s attacks on Libya. The Libyan 
authorities seem to have been poorly stage managers, though. As Davies reported: “A 
member of the hospital staff passed a scrap of paper to the press. It was a hand-written note, 
in English, saying the girl was, in fact, hurt in a car accident. The hospital scene, it would 
appear, was a complete sham.” The whole effect of clumsy propaganda was subsequently 
reinforced when a man who had been presented in the hospital as Hanin’s uncle reappeared at 
the site of another supposed air strike. Challenged by reporters, who recognised him from his 
earlier role, he was unmasked as a Libyan government employee.  
This kind of clumsiness is not confined to the Libyans. Reporting for the BBC from 
Chechnya in 2000, I remember being taken to a village recently “liberated”, in the words of 
our Russian government minders, from rebel control. The village’s football field had become 
a cemetery. A local woman was brought forward to tell the international journalists who had 
come on the organised trip what had happened. Our minders had assured us that we would 
hear stories of civilians killed by Chechen fighters. One of the mounds of earth was 
noticeably larger than the rest. “Was it the grave of a family?” a photographer asked. 
Apparently, it was not. The woman, to the frustration of our minders, explained that it was 
the burial place of some bandits killed by the militia, as the Russian police were then called.  
Governments, Public Relations, and Propaganda 
As the first decade of this century went on, revenues from rising international energy prices 
made the Russian government richer. They seem to have become wiser, too. Perhaps realising 
that they were not seeing their story told in the international media in the way they wanted, 
they hired western PR agencies to help them. As BBC Moscow correspondent from 2006-
2009, I frequently dealt with one such company, GPlus Europe, on stories ranging from the 
2006 G8 Summit in St Petersburg, to the 2008 war with Georgia. In that conflict, Georgia, 
whose government since 2003 has been keen to break free from the residual Russian 
influence which remained after the collapse of Communism, also used Western PR 
consultants.  
While Russian and Georgian soldiers killed and died on the battlefield in the dusty heat of a 
Caucasus summer, the two squadrons of spin doctors confronted each other over the 
international airwaves, bombarding journalists around the world with emails and text 
messages. Countless other countries, including some of those whose rulers came unstuck in 
the Arab Spring, have also sought professional help to develop their media strategies. Global 
news channels such as BBC World News, CNN, Al Jazeera, and their imitators, have created 
new, international, audiences. They have also created a new propaganda battleground where 
consultants and public relations executives fight to get their clients’ versions of events 
accepted. It has become such a major industry that, in 2010, the Guardian declared London 
“world capital of reputation laundering”. 8  
“It has been increasing for some time now, and I believe it’s still on the increase,” a source 
with long-term experience of the industry said of sometimes unsavoury governments’ 
attempts to improve their image by using the services of Western public relations consultants. 
“We had an approach a couple of weeks ago from a country that has huge reputational 
problems, that was waving a multi-million dollar contract, and we turned them down. These 
were not people we would want to represent,” the source explained during a conversation in 
July 2011, before adding: “They’ll find someone in London.”  
That likelihood is worrying for journalism – especially at a time when both journalists and 
public relations executives know that reporters’ time is increasingly short. In an article for the 
National Union of Journalists’ magazine, the Journalist, in 2011, Stefan Stern, a former 
writer for the Financial Times, reflected on his new job with the public relations company, 
Edelman. He addressed journalists’ traditional idea of public relations as the “dark side”. He 
shares his first impressions of his new workplace. “Not very dark. In fact, this seemed to be a 
surprisingly sunny (and well-resourced) world.” 9 The phrase “well-resourced” brings to 
mind Nick Davies’ point in Flat Earth News about the greater number of people now 
employed in PR compared to in journalism. 10  
If corrupt regimes are able to “find someone in London” to launder their reputation, there are 
potentially serious consequences for the kind of reporting our audiences will receive. And 
while it is true that digital technology has made a massive contribution to the way the events 
of the “Arab Spring” have been communicated to listeners, viewers, and readers around the 
world, those events have also demonstrated its limits, and potential pitfalls. The case of 
Amina, the Syrian lesbian blogger who was not 11 (as discussed elsewhere in this volume by 
Daniel Bennett) demonstrated both that online material can be highly misleading, and that 
social networking sites (in this case, National Public Radio’s Andy Carvin and his followers 
on Twitter) can help to expose the deception.  
Twitter and Facebook themselves, however, will not be enough to enable journalists and their 
audiences to see through the fog of propaganda which governments and their hired assistants 
summon up with the sorcery of their communications strategies. As Piers Robinson and his 
co-authors write in Pockets of Resistance, their study of British news media and the reporting 
of the 2003 invasion of Iraq: “Even if, over time, new communication technologies have 
increased the potential power of news media outlets, increasingly professional government 
media-management techniques may have been effective in countering these  
developments.” 12  
How Can Journalists Respond? 
What can journalists do to try to guard against attempts, crude or clever, to influence them? 
The answer is the best of the old, and the best of the new. By the best of the old, I mean the 
need to check sources, and check information, as far as possible. That involves not only 
recognising the enduring value of eyewitness reporting, but also placing renewed emphasis 
on standing stories up properly. This is where the best of the new comes in. As Andy Carvin 
has demonstrated with his extensive network of followers on Twitter, new technology does 
offer new possibilities. Carvin has facilitated extensive coverage of the Arab Spring without 
being based in the region. Only by combining these two approaches – rigorous research and 
fact-checking, and networks of sources – can journalists hope to generate enough bright rays 
to burn off the fog of propaganda.  
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